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Abstract: 
In this thesis the determinants of market-to-book ratio on European banks from 1987 - 2012 is 
analyzed with focus on determining whether European banks are under a too-big-to-fai 
protection, or if they are too big to save. The thesis argues that European banks on average 
trades with a relative premium due to too-big-to-fail protection, and that the largest and most 
systemic banks are priced lower than its less systemic peers, possibly through being too big to 
save. This tendency is strengthened in the years after 2008. These results are found by 
implementing the empirical approach introduced by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) on my 
dataset of bank- and country-specific variables on European banks from 1987 - 2012.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
After the 2008-2009 financial crisis several of the largest European banks have reduced their 
size, after almost 20 years of growth. This reduction in size might be as a result of the banks had 
grown too large for the government authorities to be able to save them in time of crisis. Such 
too-big-to-save episodes were seen in the 2008 crisis, with the failure of the Icelandic banking 
industry in 2008 and more recently the restructure of Cyprus banks as examples. Are European 
banks too big to fail or too big to save? This thesis analyses the determinants of equity pricing 
on European banks, to find evidence about the banks’ status as either too big to fail (TBTF) or 
too big to save (TBTS). I use OLS regressions in my analysis of market-to-book ratio on 141 
European banks, determined by bank- and country-specific variables. The methodology follows 
the framework by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012). See Appendix 2 for detailed list of 
variables used and its sources.  
To determine whether a bank is important enough to get rescued in time of crisis, the term 
systemic is used. This thesis uses bank liabilities as a share of country GDP as a measurement of 
how systemic the bank is. This approach is consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012), 
and others (see for instance: Völz and Wedow 2011). Barth and Schnabel (2013) argue for the 
use of delta-CoVar analysis as presented by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) when determining 
which banks are systemic. The method seeks to identify which contribution a single bank has on 
the greater systemic risk. Brown and Dinc (2011) analyses the concept of “Too Many to Fail”. 
Stern and Feldman (2009) define big in TBTF as: “banks that play an important role in the 
country’s financial system and its economic performance” (Stern and Feldman 2009:12). Barth 
and Schnabel (2013) use the word systemic instead of big, as in “Too Systemic to Fail”. 
In a situation where a bank is being stressed by losses on its balance sheet, and the overall value 
of its assets is less than its liabilities, government has more or less two opportunities; either to 
let the bank file for bankruptcy and be exposed to the costs with a failing bank, or take the cost 
of saving the bank. It is usually very difficult to disclose the costs of either the two alternatives, 
as a bank balance sheet often is complex and contains a significant amount of illiquid and 
intangible assets. Banks are also widely integrated through the interbank lending markets, and a 
failing bank could immediately cause problems for the bank’s counterparties. Usually banks 
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have between 5-9 % of its total assets in liquid assets, which leaves it very exposed to losses. 
This makes banking a fragile industry, and a big bank failing could also lead to a crisis of 
confidence in the financial markets as a whole (Mishkin 2006). This situation is known as an 
information crisis, due to lack of information on counterparty exposure being the main reason 
for the unwillingness of lending out money. 
All elements put together, it is quite clear that politicians and the government agencies is in a 
very delicate situation when deciding whether the bank is to be saved or not. History shows that 
in most cases when a bank is near failure the authorities steps up and saves the depositors, 
creditors, and sometimes even the owners (Stern and Feldman 2009). Because the common 
practice is saving rather than failing, large banks are commonly thought to have a too-big-to-fail 
protection. It can be seen as a dilemma between two evils, were the authorities have to choose 
between having a bankruptcy with uncontrolled implications and third-party costs to the 
economy as a whole, or a more controlled bailout, although with unknown ultimate direct costs 
and high long term indirect economic costs because of strengthening moral hazard. 
This thesis finds evidence suggesting that most banks with systemic size greater than 0,1 
contains a market-to-book premium compared to less systemic banks. And evidence indicating 
less or no premium on banks who reach systemic size greater than 1. And lastly evidence 
suggesting a too-big-to-save discount in market-to-book-ratio in the years 2008-2012 for banks 
with systemic size greater than 1. 
Chapter 2 presents background and theory regarding TBTF, with relevant examples from the 
recent financial crisis. Chapter 3 presents the variables I use in the regressions, with 
explanations on its’ relevance as determinants, followed by a presentation of key issues in the 
methodology. Chapter 4 is dedicated to summary- and descriptive statistics from my dataset. 
Chapter 5 contains the empirical results, with analysis of its relevance to the discussion on TBTF 
versus TBTS, followed by robustness checks on the results. Chapter 6 includes a short summary 
of the analysis in chapter 5, followed by concluding words and final thoughts.  
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Chapter 2: Background and theory 
 
In this chapter I first present logic about why banks are important, and why that importance 
might lead to a systemic status with a too-big-to-fail protection from the authorities. Further I 
explain why banks would want to grow large, and discuss how big the problem of TBTF is today, 
and how some banks might have turned too big to save. At the end I present a quick résumé of 
TBTF-related events in the recent global financial crisis, and explain the increasingly important 
role of central banks.  
2.1 Banks are important 
Banks have an important role in modern economies, providing a vital service both for 
companies and private households. The idea that banks sometimes are too important to file for 
bankruptcy is a widely accepted hypothesis. This is usually spelled ‘Too Big to Fail’, implying that 
banks are too big for the government not to intervene if the bank is on brink of failure.  Main 
factors contributing to banks’ special systemic status is: 
A) Banks are the largest lenders to businesses and households, and consequences of a bank 
failure will most likely result in harsher conditions for the companies and households who seek 
financing, due to lost information-capital in the failing bank (Mishkin 2006, Ashcraft 2004). 
Banks also affecting households and companies through its lending practice; is money available 
for households and companies, and at what price? One important escalating factor in the 
recession springing from the 2008-2009 financial crisis was bank tightening their lending 
businesses, making it hard for companies and households to finance even economically sound 
investments. 
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Figure 2.A – Net percentage of banks tightening lending standards.  
 
Figure 2.A shows how banks in the European Monetary Union (EMU) tightened its lending in the 
years from 2007. Banks are required to hold a specified capital ratio due to regulatory 
requirement and to maintain creditworthiness. When faced with increased losses like in 2007-
2008, banks need to either raise new capital by issuing new equity or debt, or to gradually build 
up new capital by not lending out more money. The latter option is often the most rationale 
solution for banks; which is observed in figure 1. Banks tightening lending in fear of worse 
economic times could also be a self-fulfilling prophecy, possibly triggering fall in house-prices 
and less employment, which again triggering increase in bank losses. 
B) Bank deposits and savings accounts are a large share of a country’s money supply, which in 
times of crisis would cause a decline in money supply if scared depositors were to take out their 
money from banks (Kaufman 1996). Many banks also provide vital parts of a countries payment-
system (Kaufman 1996).  
C) Banks are connected to each other in many ways; through interbank lending, derivatives 
exposure, interbank counterparties in trades, and mutual ownership in subsidiary companies. 
This interconnection between banks should be an important factor giving banks the special 
status; As if one bank files for bankruptcy it will spread fear in financial markets on which other 
banks having direct or indirect exposure to the failing bank (Kaufman 1994 and 1996). One 
recent example of such fear can be found in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers filing for 
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bankruptcy September 2008, when fear spread of which banks had exposure to Lehman 
Brothers.  
Table 2.A 
  List of banks with systemic size >0,5 in 2011 Systemic size Country 
BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES SA   0,5213 Portugal 
BBVA 0,5244 Spain 
UNICREDIT SPA 0,5518 Italy 
SOCIETE GENERALE GROUP 0,566 France 
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 0,586 United Kingdom 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC 0,6094 United Kingdom 
ERSTE GROUP BK AG 0,6478 Austria 
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN 0,6672 Sweden 
KBC GROUP NV 0,7263 Belgium 
DNB ASA 0,7382 Norway 
BANK OF GREECE 0,7793 Greece 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 0,8136 Germany 
CREDIT AGRICOLE SA 0,8386 France 
HSBC BANK MALTA PLC 0,8494 Malta 
BANK OF IRELAND 0,9097 Ireland 
BNP PARIBAS 0,9414 France 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP 0,9437 United Kingdom 
BANK OF VALLETTA LTD 0,9568 Malta 
BARCLAYS PLC 0,9882 United Kingdom 
BANCO SANTANDER SA 1,099 Spain 
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP 1,718 Switzerland 
NORDEA BANK AB 1,761 Sweden 
ESPIRITO SANTO FINANCIAL GRP 1,816 Luxembourg 
DANSKE BANK AS 1,851 Denmark 
CYPRUS POPULAR BANK PCL 1,867 Cyprus 
BANK OF CYPRUS PUBLIC CO LTD 1,973 Cyprus 
UBS AG 2,32 Switzerland 
HSBC HLDGS PLC 2,511 United Kingdom 
This table shows banks with liabilities as a share of GDP that exceeds 0,5, namely systemic size >0,5. Country is the country 
where the banks headquarter lies. Data is from European banks in 2011. 
In most modern economies the government provides a safety net to prevent banking panics, 
which can be seen as evidence that banks do possess a special status in the economy. By 
guaranteeing for some of the deposits, usually up to a fixed amount per savings account, it is 
removing a disciplining factor in the bank. A bank in a country with no safety net for 
depositors would have to hold more capital in case of a bank run, compared to a bank in a 
country with a safety net (Mishkin 2006). Bank safety net is usually split into one official part, 
which typically contains a version of deposit insurance, and an unofficial or implicit part. The 
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unofficial safety net is where TBTF protection lies; an implicit guarantee by the authorities to 
bank liability-owners that the bank will not go bust. This happens because the authorities are 
afraid of the consequences of letting a bank file for bankruptcy, I will discuss this more in 
detail in subsection 2.3.  
2.2 Why banks pursue size 
Banks have incentive to endeavor status as a systemically important bank so that the bank is 
able to claim additional protection through the implicit safety net, incentives to become ‘Too 
Big to Fail’. Banks will try to grow larger, to get more complex, and to be more involved with 
other banks. In the years before the financial crisis of 2008-09 the big banks grew larger than 
the economy (see fig. 2.C at page 11 for an illustration of this) consistent with the incentive of 
becoming more systematic. Further I will explain shortly the dynamics of banks being able to 
increase their size and exposure when they hold TBTF protection through the implicit safety net.  
The key factor in determining what creditors charge for their money is the probability of not 
getting their money back, for instance due to a bankruptcy. Because of lower risk of default 
creditors would accept a lower rate of return on its capital to TBTF banks (Stern and Feldman 
2009).  Banks with status as TBTF are encouraged by relative cheaper cost of capital to increase 
their activities. This is a misallocation of capital, as the TBTF banks operating on a larger scale of 
activity, and non TBTF-banks have incentives towards reaching TBTF status. 
Fig. 2.B shows the increased activity from 1 to 2 due to cheaper capital available, the 
misallocation of capital into banking is represented by the alternative position 3 in the Non-TBTF 
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industries. Incentives are skewed for banks to be covered of the unofficial safety net through 
gaining TBTF protection, so they can achieve cheaper capital. 
There is also other reasons for banks growing in size, as some parts of modern banking have a 
greater scale of economics than traditional banking, for example securitization of assets. But 
even though there are legitimate reasons to grow large, it is likely that banks have grown this 
large also due to management see their importance and compensation increase with bank size 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2012). 
2.3 How big is the problem of TBTF? 
The main reason for TBTF is creditors expecting to be saved by the authorities if the bank fails, 
even if the policymakers and controlling agencies state in normal times that they will not step 
up for non-insured deposits and creditors. Policymakers have regularly stated that banks should 
not count on being rescued if on the brink of failing, however history shows that in some way 
banks and financial institutions do get saved when close to failure. The difference between what 
policymakers and regulatory authorities say they will do, and what they actual do is a time-
inconsistency problem. There is an obvious lack of credibility in the policymaker’s consistency 
towards holding long-term economic benefits above the short-term costs of letting a bank file 
for bankruptcy. Stern and Feldman (2009) are drawing a link between this time-inconsistency 
and credibility problem with the time-inconsistency and credibility problems in monetary policy 
discussed extensively in economics, (see for instance Kydland and Prescott 1977).  
Since it is hard to accurately quantify the value or size of TBTF, the logic of time-inconsistency is 
central in understanding that TBTF still is a problem in the economics of banking and finance, 
even though it is almost 30 years since Congressman McKinney used the expression “Too Big To 
Fail” during the inquiry into a large bank rescue in the Unites States in 1984 (Conover, 1984:288). 
Stern and Feldman’s understanding of TBTF implies that changes in deposit-guarantee or other 
safety-net policy changes will not have effect on the TBTF, since unsecured creditors still believe 
they will be rescued when on the brink of failing. 
Stern and Feldman (2009) are focusing on three main developments in banking and finance who 
each increasing the extent of banks being recipients of TBTF protection. The criteria is originally 
from 2004, but I find them just as relevant in today’s banking. 
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1. Increased concentration on banking assets: The big banks have grown even bigger during the 
90’s and early 00’s mostly by big mergers and acquisitions. While during the finance crisis of 08-
09 we saw a number of failing banks being bought by rival banks with backup from the 
authorities. One example is the creation of Bankia in Spain, which consisted of a number of 
failing medium sized savings- and loan banks. Banks growing even bigger in absolute terms, and 
compared to its country’s economic size most likely have strengthened creditors’ view of being 
under TBTF protection. 
2. Greater complexity of banking operations and activities, increasingly important in the 
payment system: Financial innovations and technology development have made the few largest 
banks increasingly important to the payment-related activities.  Securitization, derivatives and 
off-balance sheet activities makes the banking more complex, which increases the uncertainty 
when trying to do a cost-benefit analysis of saving or not saving the bank. Increased complexity 
most likely also increases creditor’s expectation of TBTF protection.   
3. Several policy decisions, such as highly visible government bailouts: Financial crisis 
increased in frequency the last 40 years and with it, large bank bailouts. In the recent financial 
crisis and economic downturn from 2008 -2012 many TBTF banks have been rescued wholly or 
partly by the authorities. Some interesting cases come later in this chapter. TBTF protection is 
renewed to creditors who on a regularly basis get confirmed that the authorities stepping up 
when a bank is close to failure.  
2.4 Banks growing too large? 
In light of the recent financial crisis there has been renewed focus on an alternative view 
on authorities being able to save its financial institutions, namely the topic of ‘Too Big to Save’, 
TBTS. A country’s ability to rescue a failing bank depends mainly on two factors; the size of the 
bank and the country’s overall economic and financial situation. In the last 5 years both 
circumstances have pulled towards less capability to rescue banks; bad banks have been 
merged or acquired by larger and better banks, public finances in many countries have 
continued to deteriorate in the years following the crisis of 08-09.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) states that under normal business cycle conditions banks 
probably could have strengthened their TBTF protection, but in light of the economic downturn 
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and increasing debt levels of governments, it is not sure anymore if a country is able to cover for 
its largest banks. Financially strapped governments are also under a large public pressure of not 
spending hard-earn taxpayer money on big banks, which in that case TBTF protection is 
swapped for TBTS status. Later this question will be analyzed empirically on European banks. 
Barth and Schnabel 2012 gives a brief overview of some papers covering the topic of TBTS, 
which has been analyzed much less than its brother; TBTF. One prime example of TBTS in the 
recent years is Iceland; its three banks was almost 10 times Icelandic GDP, whereas Iceland 
could never have guaranteed for all the unsecured deposits and liabilities to creditors when the 
banks failed in October 2008. Another example is the Irish government guaranteeing for all bank 
liabilities, both unsecured deposits and creditors. This had a huge effect on Irish public finances, 
as it went from being the least indebted nation in EU to one of the worst with >100% debt-to-
GDP ratio (Martin and Waller 2012), peaking 120% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2013(Reuters 
27.04.2012). 
              
Figure 2.C: Liabilities-to-GDP ratio for 5 of the largest banks in my dataset in 2012, and Bank of Ireland. 
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Figure 2.C illustrates the vast growth in large European banks in the years leading to the 
financial crisis.  
2.5 TBTF-related events in 2008-2012 
In this subsection I will give a quick presentation of some important events during the recent 
financial crisis that most likely had an effect on creditor’s consciousness of being under a TBTF 
protection or not. In light of my analysis of whether banks are TBTF or TBTS, I find it interesting 
to underline a few and very important related events in the recent financial crisis. I will present 
small comments at each event, and some final thoughts in the end.  
Nationalization of Northern Rock – 18.02.2008: The bank was eventually nationalized on 
Sunday 18.02.2008 after struggling with heavy losses on American subprime mortgages. As early 
as September 2007 it received extended loans from The Bank of England, and guarantees from 
the Minister of Finance Alistair Darling, that all deposits were safe. Northern Rock was one of 
Britain’s largest lenders, and most likely had status as TBTF; quoting John McFall, MP and UK 
Treasury Select Committee: “The fact that the Bank (Bank of England) is willing to act should be 
reassuring." (BBC 13.09.07).  It is easy to understand that depositors and creditors in other 
British banks understand this as having TBTF protection.   
JP Morgan buys Bear Stearns – 16.03.2008: In a deal orchestrated by the FED, JP Morgan 
bought Bear Sterns after a run on the investment bank. Bear Stearns was unable to get liquidity 
in the financial markets, and asked the FED for a loan (New York Times 17.03.2008). However 
the FED arranged a deal with JP Morgan buying Bear Stearns, with guarantees on FED buying 
$29 billion of toxic assets off Bear Stearns balance sheet (Wall Street Journal 16.03.2009). The 
FED Chairman Ben Bernanke later stated under the congressional hearing that they were afraid 
of a “chaotic unwinding of investments in the U.S. economy” (Bloomberg 02.04.2008). Bear 
Stearns was seen as one of the most ruthless investment banks on Wall Street, and by being 
saved contributing to the overall impression of TBTF protection of big bank creditors. 
Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers – 15.09.2008: Lehman Brothers, at the time fourth largest 
investment bank in the U.S., filed for bankruptcy protection 15.09.2008, after failing to reach an 
agreement orchestrated by the FED for being bought by Barclays PLC or Bank of America (New 
York Times 14.09.2008). The financial markets plummeted the following days, and investment 
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banks were effectively stripped of their TBTF protection (Economist 15.09.2008).  Failure of 
Lehman Brothers was in many ways the defining moment of the subprime crisis evolving to a 
systemic financial crisis, since the widespread impression of the financial markets was that no 
major financial institution would be allowed to file for bankruptcy (Baldwin, 2009: 9). 
Nationalization of UK banks: All UK banks but two (HSBC and Barclays) received bailouts and 
was partly nationalized in the recent financial crisis (Telegraph 13.10.2008).  Especially Royal 
Bank of Scotland had to be rescued in a spectacular injection of new capital by the finance 
ministry, as well as an injection of capital in the newly merged ‘superbank’ named Lloyds 
Banking Group made out of HBOS and Lloyds-TSB (Daily Mail 13.07.2009). Stockowners were 
diluted by the injection of capital, where the state as of June 2013 owns 82% of RBS and 40% of 
Lloyds TSB. No losses to creditors most likely fueled the impression of TBTF protection.  
Long Term Refinancing Operations and ECB Bank rescue packages: The European Central Bank 
(ECB) introduced cheap credit to banks through an extension of their refinancing program LTRO 
(Financial Times Lexicon 2013). Credit was offered at 1% at 3 years maturity in December 2011 
and February 2012, where 523 and 800 banks lent respectively €489bn and €529,5bn from the 
central bank. Banks were now able to post mortgage-backed-securities, sovereign bonds and 
other commercial paper as collateral for the cheap loans. €325bn euro went to banks in 
troubling countries such as Greece, Ireland, Spain and Italy (Guardian 29.02.2012). In August 
2012 ECB launched Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), a program set to directly buy 
sovereign bonds from troubling countries. These operations had huge impact on the European 
banking industry, and can easily be presumed as a ‘bailout’ of banks, probably strengthening 
TBTF impression in Europe.  
Summary of 2.5 
Both TBTF and TBTS episodes were present in the recent financial crisis, however in most 
occasions it seemed as the authorities preferred to save the troubling bank. In the clearest TBTS 
case with Icelandic banks, the authorities really did not have any other alternatives. Failure of 
Lehman Brothers was obviously a shock to both creditors and policymakers; creditors were 
shocked about being stripped of TBTF protection, while policymakers were shocked about the 
consequences of letting Lehman fail. Through the crisis the UK have rescued almost its entire 
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banking system, completely shielding creditors, which might be the clearest signal of existing 
too-big-to-fail protection.  
2.6 The increasingly important role of central banks 
Through the financial crisis the central banks played an ever increasingly important role in 
managing the financial markets. Efforts like lowering interest rate to record lows, open market 
operations such as quantative easing (QE) and OMT, extensive lending in central bank discount 
window and official statements made. Mario Draghi stated in July 2012 when introducing OMT 
that he would “do whatever it takes” to help Europe from the financial crisis (Economist 
08.06.2013). As recently as 9th June 2013 a spokesman for ECB stated that “There is no limit to 
the ECBs bond-buying program” (Reuters 09.06.2013). In the US Ben Bernanke have underlined 
that QE will be continued until a specified unemployment-rate is reached. Central banks have 
most likely become important players in whether or not creditors believe they are under a TBTF 
protection or not. Consistent with research by Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibáñez 
(2010) argues that easy monetary policies affect banks in taking greater risks.  
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Chapter 3 – Variables and methodology 
 
In this chapter I present the bank-specific and country-specific variables I use in the regression 
analysis, with explanations of its relevance as determinants of my endogenous variable market-
to-book ratio. I follow the same methodology as Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012), with some 
adjustments on variables which will be commented on.  
3.1 Market-to-book 
In my analysis of ‘too big to fail’ versus ‘too big to bail’ I use Market-to-book ratio as my 
endogenous variable in the regressions. Market-to-book ratio also known as Price-to-book ratio 
is the ratio of a firm’s market capitalization to the book value of shareholders equity (Berk and 
DeMarzo 2007:26). The ratio is indicating whether investors are willing to pay more or less for 
the firm, than its balance sheet indicates what the firm is worth. If a ratio exceeds one, it is a 
signal that investors think the firm is able to create value of the firm’s assets which exceeds the 
liquidation value. However a market-to-book ratio is also affected by other non-firm-specific 
variables such as inflation (Brealey, Myers and Allen 2011:120). How the balance sheet is 
reported would also affect the Market-to-book ratio, for example if a company has a lot of 
intangible assets not reported in the balance, the firm would come out with very high ratio, 
reflecting that the actual assets in the firm is higher than the assets reported in the balance 
sheet. In light of this it is clear that there will be huge differences between industries, reflecting 
for instance if the industry is highly capital intensive, or has most of its assets through human 
capital or other intangible assets. For example a consultancy firm versus a railroad company; 
whereas the consultancy firm’s only assets are the office building, compared to the railroad 
company owning whole railroads, trains and train-stations.  
There are obvious problems of using market-to-book ratio when setting the value of a single 
firm, or when comparing firms in different industries; however it is quite useful as a tool for 
comparing firms in the same industry. In European banks the average market-to-book ratio was 
0,74 in January of 2013, while in the US banks the same ratio averaging on 0,98 (Damodaran 
01.2013), perhaps indicating that investors believe many of the assets in European banks are 
worth less than in US banks. A reasonable explanation could be that European banks are more 
13 
 
exposed to countries with severe public economy problems, reflecting expected write-downs of 
the bank’s assets.  
Another explanation is that European banks are priced lower because of the authorities being 
less able to step up and rescue the banks if failure, or with other words; the too-big-to-fail 
protection is less worth in Europe than in the US. Or the other side of the same solution; that 
European banks have gained too-big-to-save status. I will focus on these questions in my 
regressions later, where market-to-book ratio is the dependent value.   
3.2 CDS – credit default swap 
In addition to Market-to-book, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) uses CDS as dependent 
variable explained by the same explanatory- and control variables. CDS is thought to be relevant 
in determining whether the bank is TBTF or TBTS as the price of the CDS reflects bondholders 
expected loss. CDS can be seen as insurance for bondholders against not receiving par value on 
their bonds at maturity, the seller guarantees repayment on the nominal amount insured, and 
the buyer pays an annual premium for the insurance. The premium is often known as the CDS 
spread, expressed in basis points of the par value (Eliassen 2010).   
In my analysis I will not include CDS due to limited access on data. CDS is traded over-the-
counter on different bond maturities, and with different restructuring clause. In Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2012) they have less than 5% the amount of observations on CDS observations 
than Market-to-book. Through NHH I could only access 5 years of data on a handful of my banks, 
hence I got to the conclusion not to include CDS as dependent variable in my analysis.  
3.3 Explanatory variables 
Bank liabilities and its property of measuring systemic size: In measuring how important a 
bank is to its home-country I use the term systemic, and I measure systemic size by dividing the 
total bank liabilities by country GDP. There are other factors which affect the systemic status to 
a bank than the absolute size of its liabilities; however they all tend to be hard to measure 
accurately, and the size of bank liabilities as easy to measure should be a reliable tool. Though in 
reality would perhaps a small and regional bank be just as systemically important than a large 
and global bank located in the same country, because the regional bank would have large 
amount of information capital by knowing the local industries, which could be lost in a bank 
default. By including a large number of banks from several countries in my analysis I will 
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strengthen liabilities-to-GDP ratio’s validity as a measurement of systemic size. By using 
liabilities as a whole I am implying that the total liabilities would be saved in a bank rescue 
operation, not only the deposit insurance guaranteed amount.  
There is a possibility that the relationship between systemic status and liabilities ratio is non-
linear, hence not explained by liabilities-to-GDP. To allow for an exponential relationship 
between liabilities and GDP I include liabilities-to-GDP ratio squared in some of my regressions. 
Another way of handling a non-linear systemic size relationship is to include dummy variables 
on systemic size; in the analysis I test for dummy variables with systemic size 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 and 1. 
Further I include size of other banks total liabilities-to-GDP ratio, to check whether size of other 
banks affect market-to-book valuation of the actual bank, as well as including variable for total 
country bank size-to-GDP ratio.  
Assets: My second explanatory variable is bank assets, presented as the natural logarithm of 
balance-reported total assets. Assets show bank absolute size, and should affect bank valuation 
among other things; bank economies of scale, benefit of diversification and growth 
opportunities.  
Fiscal balance: The last explanatory variable is fiscal balance, defined as government income 
minus expenses as a share of GDP. The idea is that the current state of country public finances, 
as measured by fiscal balance, should effect market-to-book valuation of banks if the banks 
possess status as TBTF (or TBTS).  If a country’s public finances are in a relatively bad state, it is 
less likely to provide for an extensive implicit safety-net; hence in a TBTS situation banks should 
expect even less of its TBTF protection when a country faces bad public finances. As many 
European countries facing difficult economic times it is likely that fiscal balance would affect 
market-to-book ratio.  
Fiscal balance is affected by cyclical changes in the economy. To try and correct for this, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) uses old age dependency ratio and openness to trade as 
instruments for fiscal balance. I will describe IV regression and the variables later in this chapter. 
As a robustness check I also swap fiscal balance with primary fiscal balance and government 
spending. 
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3.3.1 Bank-specific control variables  
Fee income is the natural logarithm of bank non-interest. A high fee income reflects that the 
bank gets more of its income from consultancy, corporate banking and other services, which 
might affect how the bank is valuated. Usually in recessions banks would see their losses on 
loans rise, then if the bank gets a relatively higher part of its income from non-interest 
operations it would not be as exposed to the recession. However there are many non-interest 
banking services which suffer from being in a very cyclical market, like mergers and acquisitions 
or initial public offerings. Research by Baele, Jonghe and Vennet (2007) suggests that bank value 
is positively related with higher share of non-interest income.  
Leverage is defined as total bank liabilities to total assets, and shows how large share of the 
bank’s assets are externally financed. A high leverage implies that the bank owners has to put 
up relatively less equity for the same amount of assets owned by the bank, creating a larger 
return on equity for the owners, which again should affect the banks market-to-book value 
positively. Leverage is also making the bank more vulnerable to volatility on its asset value and 
earnings, which in some cases should lead to a negative effect on market-to-book ratio. The 
higher leverage in a bank – the less losses the bank can absorb before the amount of liabilities 
surpasses the value of its assets, in other words bank getting insolvent. Hence should a bank 
with high risk and high leverage have negative effect on market-to-book value, which leads to 
the next control variable. 
Bank asset risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock prices multiplied with the 
ratio of market value of common equity to the book value of bank assets. This ratio shows the 
deleveraged bank asset risk, isolating the underlying asset risk from leverage-related risk. A 
higher leveraged bank with safer assets could have lower chances of failure than a low 
leveraged bank with a lot of toxic assets. This difference is covered in the analysis by using an 
interaction term with bank asset risk and leverage to define how exposed the bank is to 
insolvency. A near-insolvent bank should result in lower market-to-book ratio. 
Pre-tax income is total pre-tax income as a share of total assets. A bank with high pre-tax 
income is able to generate more income out of the same amount of assets, hence it should be 
priced at relatively higher market-to-book ratio.  
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3.3.2 Country-specific control variables 
GDP per capita is total country GDP divided by country citizens, and is reported in constant 
2000 USD. GDP per capita indicates how well overall economic development is in a country.  
GDP growth is the growth of GDP in real terms, which is a proxy for overall economic growth in 
the country, which again influence potential growth in banking.  
Primary balance is included as an alternative measurement of current country financials. 
Primary balance is government income minus expenses minus interest payments on 
government debt. This variable is used in robustness checks on my initial empirical results.  
Government spending is total government spending per year as a share of GDP, and figures as a 
third way of measuring current state of public finances. This variable is used in robustness 
checks on my initial empirical results. 
In addition to these bank- and country-specific control variables; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2012) included deposit market share, leverage other banks, time since crisis, past crisis and 
past fiscal cost as control variables. Deposit market share is the ratio between bank liabilities 
and total bank liabilities in a country. My observations of total bank liabilities by country are too 
limited to include deposit market share as control variable in my analysis (reduces observations 
with 40%), however when included, it is estimated with very low economic significance (not 
reported). Due to limited database access was data on control variable leverage other banks not 
available. The data from control variables time since crisis, past crisis and past fiscal costs are 
variables identified by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010), were not available.  
3.4 Methodology 
I follow the methodology of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) in the empirical analysis, 
performing regressions where I aim to explain how the bank- and country-specific variables 
discussed above affect market-to-book ratio, and on behalf of the estimated coefficients try to 
locate whether banks in Europe trade with a TBTF protection or with a TBTS status. Since my 
dataset is collected over a period of 25 years it could be subject to possible auto-correlations. It 
is not unlikely that some of the variables affecting market-to-book ratio contains lagged effects, 
hence the problem of non-independent residual within each bank across time periods, which 
again could cause heteroscedasticity. Another possible problem is serial correlation, correlation 
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between some of the banks within a time period. It is reasonable to think that valuation of 
banks from the same country somehow is correlated, for example due to regulatory changes or 
cyclical fluctuations. To cope with these auto- and serial-correlation problems I run all 
regressions in the analysis with adjustments for correlations within each group, having defined 
each bank as a group. As well as estimating robust standard errors using the Huber-White 
estimators, to adjusts for problems with normality and heteroscedasticity. Having done these 
measures I assume my estimated coefficients and standard error to be valid estimates on 
determinants for market-to-book ratio to be used in the further analysis. 
In the last part of the analysis I perform multiple robustness checks to look for economic 
inconsistencies in my results. First I swap liabilities-to-GDP with the various Big dummy variables 
to include possibility of non-linear relationship between systemic size and market-to-book ratio. 
Then I test for different measures of current state of public finances by using government 
spending and primary fiscal balance as variables. Lastly I add time-specific dummy variables to 
allow for structural changes in my dataset, respectively when the EMU countries adopted Euro 
as common currency in 1999 and at the 2008 financial crisis.  
3.4.1 Instrumental variable approach 
Instrumental Variable regression is used by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012); using old-age 
dependency ratio and openness to international trade as instruments for fiscal balance. Old-age 
dependency ratio is the number of people above 65 years as a share of working age population, 
which should proxy how the economic outlook for a country is, based upon the relationship 
between workers who pay tax and seniors receiving pensions and health care. Openness to 
international trade is sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Research by Rodrik (1998) 
indicates that higher government spending in open economies reduces fiscal balance 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2012).  
When using openness and old age dependency ratio as instruments for fiscal balance on my 
dataset both the Sargan test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman edogeneity test fails to confirm the 
validity of the instruments. Sargan test has the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
estimates for the excluded variable. Durbin-Wu-Hausman test has the null hypothesis that the 
IV and OLS estimators are not statistically different; hence IV regression is not needed. The null 
is rejected for Sargan’s test with a p-value 0,359 suggesting that the instruments are too weak 
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and that the excluded variable is underestimated (not reported). The null is not rejected for the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test with p-value 0,000 (not reported), suggesting that IV regression is not 
needed. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) gets the same result on Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, 
but they are able to reject Sargan’s null. This difference can be explained by the selection of 
data. Where I focus only on European banks, does their dataset include data from banks globally, 
where US banks alone accounts for over 66% of analyzed banks in the dataset. Due to my 
negative results on the instrument-tests I will not use further IV regression in my analysis. 
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Chapter 4 – The dataset 
 
Since the dataset used by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) is not available, I had to collect all 
the data from various data sources available through NHH. I found it time-consuming to collect 
and prepare the data from different databases to a common form. This chapter explains shortly 
my work with the dataset, followed by descriptive and summary statistics from my dataset, 
illustrated with figures and comments. 
4.1 About the data 
I analyze a total of 141 listed European banks (see Appendix 3 for a list of banks analyzed) using 
a list of large European banks from Datastream. By choosing listed banks I get more reliable and 
comparable data, though since many of the banks are listed at several stock exchanges often in 
different currencies, I have spent a lot of time with the initial data management.  
Data is collected from several databases, but due to limited access at NHH I could not follow 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) directly on the sources. I use Compustat Global and 
Compustat Securities Daily for all bank-specific variables. IMF World Economic Outlook, OECD 
Banking Statistics and World Bank Development Indicators are used for the country-specific 
variables. See Appendix 2 for detailed list of variables and their sources. All the data are directly 
downloaded to either Stata or Excel, which are the only programs used in the empirical work of 
this thesis.  
4.2 Data problems and challenges  
During the data management work I spent a lot of time solving problem related to the data not 
fitting together. Some of the balance sheet variables are not reported in the same currency as 
the bank’s stock price, hence creating a problem when trying to use the data together. Some 
banks are listed at several stock exchanges, in different countries. Some countries have had 
periods with very high inflation followed by revaluation of the currency, which easily creates 
asymmetry and outliners in the data. The implementation of euro was introduced in the stock 
prices from 1999, but in the bank balance sheets from 1998. Time series of country GDP is 
posted in last year’s currency, compared to the bank balance sheet items that follow the actual 
currency each year. Since my market value is calculated as yearly average based on daily 
observations, I am exposed to structural changes in each bank happening in the middle of the 
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year, which can create outliers. One example is the spin-off of a polish bank November 2007, 
which adjusted book value of equity by 80%. Such outliers have been removed  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
                Table 4.A - Summary statistics on variables used (dummies not included) 
    N Mean Std.err. min max 
Market-to-book 2228 1,421 0,022 0,029 20,044 
 Assets 2225 25,394 0,063 17,388 38,308 
 Fiscal balance 2119 -2,625 0,090 -30,946 18,787 
 Liabilities 2191 0,253 0,010 0,000 4,607 
 Bank asset risk 2217 2,176 1,687 0,000 3708,759 
 Leverage 2225 0,920 0,002 0,008 0,998 
 Fee income 1837 20,812 0,075 11,581 35,025 
 Pre-tax income 2222 0,010 0,001 -0,486 0,770 
 GDP per capita 2194 28254,180 379,119 1333,606 118908,600 
 GDP growth 2182 2,207 0,059 -14,800 11,06 
 Sum liabilities 1383 2,384 0,081 0,000 31,942 
 Other liabilities 1383 2,151 0,077 -0,764 30,129 
 Square liabilities 2191 0,285 0,025 0,000 21,228 
 Primary balance 1808 0,543 0,084 -27,863 16,121 
 Gov. spend. 2119 44,441 0,151 30,315 67,225   
Year 2011 Bank systemic size <0,5 Bank systemic size <0,5 
  N Mean Std.err. N Mean Std.err. 
Market-to-book 102 0,983 0,053 30 0,772 0,087 
Assets 102 24,569 0,183 30 26,659 0,387 
Fiscal balance 102 -2,476 0,374 28 -4,251 0,953 
Liabilities 102 0,086 0,010 28 1,110 0,113 
Bank asset risk 102 0,002 0,000 30 0,001 0,000 
Leverage 102 0,909 0,008 30 0,948 0,003 
Fee income 88 19,854 0,215 25 21,719 0,454 
Pre-tax income 102 0,003 0,002 30 -0,002 0,004 
GDP per capita 102 37007,760 2554,372 28 47101,090 4342,091 
GDP growth 102 2,319 0,296 28 1,118 0,369 
Square liabilities 102 0,018 0,004 28 1,574 0,318 
Primary balance 89 -0,031 0,333 24 -2,213 0,858 
Gov. spend. 102 43,404 0,732 28 47,004 1,082 
This table shows summary statistics of variables from my dataset used directly in the analysis in later chapters. Market-to-book is the 
market value of the common equity as a share of book value of common equity. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets. Fiscal 
balance is government revenues minus expenses as a share of GDP (denoted in percentage points). Liabilities is total liabilities as a 
share of GDP. Bank asset risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily bank stock returns adjusted for leverage. Leverage is the 
total liabilities divided by total assets. Fee income is the natural logarithm of bank non-interest income. Pre-tax income is the pre-tax 
income as a share of total assets. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD.  GDP growth is growth of GDP in real terms 
(denoted in percentage points). Sum liabilities is total country bank liabilities as a share of GDP. Other liabilities is total size of other 
banks liabilities in a country as a share of GDP. Square liabilities is Liabilities squared. Primary balance is fiscal balance less interest 
expenditures, as a share of GDP. Gov. spend. Is government expenditures as a share of GDP (denoted in percentage points). 
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Table 4.A shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in my regressions and robustness 
checks, the top section is total for the whole dataset, whereas the below section is for 2011. As I 
only have complete data on 68 banks for 2012 I present 2011 numbers. It is interesting to see 
the differences between the banks with systemic size >0,5 (systemic size defined as total 
liabilities as a share of GDP) and less systemic banks.  
4.3.1 Bank-specific variables 
Market-to-book ratio has an overall mean of 1,42 compared to 0,78 in 2012 (based on 
calculations from my dataset based on observations from 68 banks in 2012). Damodaran 
(01.2013) reports a ratio of 0,74. The lower ratio indicates that banks now are less able to 
generate value compared to its book value. Another interesting observation about market-to-
book ratio is the difference between systemic banks, where banks with systemic size above 0,5 
is prices notably lower than banks with less than 0,5 in systemic size.   
Liabilities has an overall average of 0,25 in my dataset, compared to Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2012) average of 0,06. The dataset in their article is highly affected by including the US 
banks, which accounts for over 2\3 of the analyzed banks. US has a highly dispersed banking 
system with only 3 banks >0,5 in systemic size (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2012). In my study 
of European banks the 28 most systemic banks averaging systemic ratio of 1,1 in 2011, 
compared to the other 102 banks averaging at 0,086. Among the control variables pre-tax 
income is negative in 2011 for the most systemic banks, leverage is averaging 0,95 in 2011 
among the large banks compared to 0,91 in the less systemic banks.  
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This figure shows the development of market-to-book ratio and liabilities-to-GDP ratio for European banks for the years 2002–
2011. All data from my dataset. 
Figures 4.A and 2.C (found on page 9) illustrates the loss of market-to-book value and the 
systemic size has changed over the years. 4.A shows that the 15 largest banks in 2002 have lost 
its gain, and is now priced lower than its less systemic counterparts. Figure 2.C shows a vast 
decline in systemic size for some of the largest banks in Europe. Of the selected banks only HSBC 
increases its liabilities-to-GDP ratio from 2011 to 2012. Systemic size of the two Swizz banks UBS 
and Credit Suisse has declined 55% and 45% from the peak in 2005-2006. These two figures 
show that the 2008-2009 financial crisis had a remarkable effect on big banks in Europe.  
4.3.2 Country-specific variables 
Fiscal balance averaging negative 2,63%, in 2011 the financial state of the country who holds 
the 28 most systemic banks have almost twice as negative fiscal balance on average, as the 
countries containing the less systemic banks, respectively -4,25 compared to -2,47. Among the 
country-specific control variables government spending is notably higher in the countries which 
have the most systemic banks. Real term growth in GDP averaging 2,2 % for the whole dataset, 
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in 2012 the countries with the most systemic banks have on average half the growth compared 
to the rest of the countries, respectively 1,1 % and 2,3 %.  
This figure shows the market-to-book ratio during 200-2011 for a selection of European countries with large banking industry. 
This 
figure shows the difference in mean market-to-book ratio in selected European countries. 
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Figures 4.C and 4.D shows how the mean market-to-book ratio varies widely across nations. 4.C 
shows to some degree through bank valuation which country that was struck the hardest in the 
aftermath of the recent financial crisis. 4.D is status 2012, with banks in Switzerland, Germany 
and Denmark performing better than their counterparts in  UK, France, Ireland and Italy. Some 
of the differences between the countries could also be explained by different levels of TBTF-
protection or a TBTS status.  
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Chapter 5 – Analysis of the empirical evidence 
 
In this chapter I will present tests of too big to fail versus too big to save in European banking 
following the analytical approach of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012), with additional 
reflections and perspectives. First I discuss the tests, followed by empirical evidence and 
robustness checks.  
5.1 TBTF versus TBTS  
Whether a bank is too big to fail or too big to save is impossible to measure accurately, since we 
are not able to observe it directly. It should however be possible to find indication on whether 
TBTF or TBTS through investors valuation of banks. Market-to-book ratio would be positively 
affected by a TBTF protection through implicit guarantees by the country’s safety net effectively 
reduces risk of default, as in time of crisis banks close to default are often rescued as a whole. 
On the other hand when a bank is saved the authorities sometimes wipes out, or marginalizes 
the existing shareholders through nationalization or injection of fresh capital.  A TBTF protection 
would reduce the risk of bankruptcy, since a share of its risk is covered by the authorities. 
Implying that TBTF protection would also affects market-to-book ratio positive through cheaper 
cost of capital. Cheaper cost of capital is positively awarded because it should give the bank 
opportunity to create relatively more return on capital, compared to non-TBTF banks investing 
in the same assets.  
In a situation with TBTS; market-to-book ratio would be affected negatively through the same 
channels. If a country is not financially able to rescue the banks in time of crisis, all the factors 
providing a positive effect under a TBTF protection is effectively removed. Credit would get 
more expensive through bank creditors not being able to rely on implicit state guarantees.  
An important factor not discussed in Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012) is the ever increasing 
role of the central banks in the stability of financial markets. In the recent years the central 
banks have increased their activities both in traditional monetary policies, and in more of 
special interactions such as open ended buying of assets from banks (TARP) and low cost 
lending with little or no requirements to collateral posted (LTRO). The highly active central 
banks have most likely had a significant effect on bank market valuation, for example through 
its LTRO operations giving European banks very cheap long term loans, which effectively 
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reduced liquidity risk in the European bank industry. None of my variables includes this effect in 
a good way, and hence central bank activities create noise in my results.  
5.1.1 Regression table 5.A 
Market-to-book (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) 
Assets           -0.010 -0.011 -0.154 -0.107 
                 (0.016) (0.017) (0.051) (0.051) 
Fiscal balance    0.024 0.024 0.006 0.015 
                 (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) 
Liabilities      0.217 0.214 0.094 0.205 
                 (0.146) (0.147) (0.115) (0.112) 
Bank Asset Risk * Leverage 
 
-0.267 -0.280 -0.255 
                 
 
(0.074) (0.066) (0.073) 
Bank Asset Risk    
 
0.246 0.258 0.235 
                 
 
(0.068) (0.061) (0.067) 
Leverage         
 
0.178 2.600 2.448 
                 
 
(0.342) (0.852) (0.879) 
Fee Income        
  
0.129 0.073 
                 
  
(0.051) (0.049) 
Pre-tax income           
  
24.685 17.067 
                 
  
(7.597) (5.683) 
GDP per capita        
   
-0.000 
                 
   
(0.000) 
GDP growth        
   
0.078 
                 
   
(0.010) 
Constant         1.693 1.549 -0.069 0.251 
                 (0.406) (0.446) (0.817) (0.839) 
R-squared        0.021 0.029 0.137 0.250 
N. of observations 2116 2108 1728 1725 
The table shows OLS point estimators of the endogenous variable market-to-book ratio, which is the market value 
of the common equity as a share of book value of common equity. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets. 
Fiscal balance is government revenues minus expenses as a share of GDP. Liabilities is total liabilities as a share of 
GDP. Bank asset risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily bank stock returns adjusted for leverage. 
Leverage is the total liabilities divided by total assets. Fee income is the natural logarithm of bank non-interest 
income. Pre-tax income is the pre-tax income as a share of total assets. GDP per capita is in constant 2000 USD. 
GDP growth is growth of GDP in real terms. All regressions runs with robust standard error estimation, adjusted 
for correlation within each bank from year to year.  *, ** and *** is statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% 
and 1%. 
Regression 5.A - (1) shows the results of the initial regression model, fiscal balance variable 
statistically significant at <10%, variables assets and liabilities insignificant. However this first 
regression only explains about 2,1% of the actual fluctuations (R-squared = 0,021). I add the 
different bank-level control variables in (2) and (3), whereas in the last regression (4) I also add 
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country-specific control-variables. In regression (4) assets and liabilities are estimated with 
statistically significant effect at <5% and <10% level, regression explaining 22,4 % of the 
fluctuations in market-to-book ratio.  
After adding the control variables in (4), assets is negatively related to market-to-book ratio 
with a point estimator of -0,11, statistically significant at <5%. This indicating that bank size does 
matter for investors in a negative way, saying that if an already large- or medium sized bank 
were to increase its assets, it would have a ceteris paribus negative effect on the market 
valuation. This is consistent with a TBTS situation, since under a TBTF protection the bank would 
claim a relatively larger share of the implicit safety-net by increasing in absolute size. However 
there are other factors in bank asset size affecting price-to-book ratio; larger banks tend to be 
more diversified (Demsetz and Strahan 1997), hence being able to take on more risky positions, 
for example by holding more illiquid assets. Larger asset size would then point to possible higher 
future earnings due to increased diversification. Another possibility is economies- or 
diseconomies of scale due to increasing bank size. Diseconomies of scale could occur as a 
consequence of the bank being harder to manage effectively, and/or through the complexity of 
the bank making it harder for the bank to monitor and control net risk exposure. 
In Regression 5.A – (4) fiscal balance is positively related to market-to-book ratio, with a point 
estimator of 0,015, statistical significance above 10% (p-value = 0.13). This indicates that the 
state of the public finances, as measured through fiscal balance, could affect bank valuation 
though unsure due to too low significance. In a situation with TBTF protection, positive 
relationship between fiscal balance and market-to-book ratio indicating that the country is able 
to guarantee for a relatively higher (or lower) amount of the banking industry. The same logic 
attends when in a TBTS situation; the worse state public finances gets in, the less is the doubt 
that the country’s banks do possess status as TBTS. Another plausible relationship, not 
discussed in Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012), is fiscal balance affecting market-to-book value 
through future expected bank losses following that a fiscally strapped government would have 
to cut back on spending in recessions, possibly prolonging the recession. Investors would then 
price banks in fiscally strapped countries relatively less than in fiscally sound countries, due to 
relatively higher expected bank losses in recessions.  
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In table 5.A – (4) Systemic size as measured in liabilities is positively related to market-to-book 
ratio, with a point estimator of 0,205, statistically significant at <10%. Meaning that banks who 
increases their systemic size, would also increase their market valuation through increased 
market-to-book ratio. This is consistent with gaining TBTF protection when growing in systemic 
size, since a relatively more systemic bank would be able to claim a relatively higher amount of 
the implicit state guarantee. The bigger the bank is relative to GDP, the larger would the 
negative externalities of a bankruptcy be, hence increased implicit protection from the 
authorities. Another plausible explanation of bank systemic size increasing bank market 
valuation can be through less competition; it is reasonably that the largest banks do have 
greater impact on the market, and are more able to set the prices. Large and systemic banks 
would probably have greater impact on the politics considering regulation on banks, and 
controlling government agencies would be cautious about making regulations with harsh 
impacts on the systemic bank in fear of negative externalities. This is clearly hard to measure in 
any way, but there is economic logic on the thought that more political- and market power gives 
the bank a positive edge compared to other non-systemic, hence increased market valuation.  
Continuing with systemic size I would like to point out one point of view not discussed by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012); that the structure of total bank liabilities would have 
impact on bank valuation. Bank total liabilities usually exist of several different types of 
liabilities, ranging from short term interbank borrowing, fixed rate deposits, various derivatives 
liabilities and many more. Research on bank valuation by C. W. Calomiris and D. Nissim (2007) 
suggests that the composition of the underlying liabilities in total bank liabilities do have an 
effect in how profitable the bank is. 
The control variables are all statistically significant at <1% level. Bank asset risk and leverage is 
estimated with positive determinants, although the interaction between them is estimated with 
negative determinant at -0,255 and <1% significance. This reflects that a bank with both high 
asset risk and high leverage is priced relatively lower than other banks, which is consistent with 
a TBTS situation. Bank asset risk together with leverage gives an indication on the probability of 
bankruptcy. The level of leverage states how much loss a bank could cope with before being 
insolvent, and the bank asset risk states how likely a bank is to receive losses on its assets based 
on historical volatility. High leverage is not necessary a signal of a very risky bank if its assets are 
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very safe, and conversely would a high bank asset risk not necessary be a signal for a risky bank 
if the leverage is low.  
Among the other controls fee income is estimated with a point estimator of 0,083, pre-tax 
income with a point estimator of 17,137, GDP per capita with a point estimator -0,000, GDP 
growth with a point estimator of 0.083. A table showing correlation between variables is 
presented in Appendix 3. Fee income has high correlation with explanatory variable Assets, 
however this makes sense since on average large banks would generate more fee income than 
small banks. Due to large sample size I am still able to use fee income as controlling variable.  
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5.1.2 Regressions table 5.B 
Market-to-book (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) 
Assets          -0.121** -0.139*** -0.107** -0.147*** 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.051) 
Fiscal balance        0.001 -0.002 0.015 -0.002 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Bank asset risk * leverage -0.449*** -0.455*** -0.255*** -0.456*** 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.073) (0.022) 
Bank asset risk          0.413*** 0.419*** 0.235*** 0.420*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.067) (0.020) 
Leverage     2.859** 2.670** 2.453*** 2.608** 
 
(1.152) (1.033) (0.884) (1.015) 
Fee income            0.100** 0.092* 0.073 0.097** 
 
(0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) 
Pre-tax income            14.350** 14.791*** 17.071*** 14.681*** 
 
(5.569) (5.557) (5.688) (5.520) 
GDP per capita       -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.078*** 0.092*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
Sum liabilities  -0.000 
   
 
(0.029) 
   Liabilities 
 
0.359** 0.195 0.520* 
  
(0.157) (0.231) (0.277) 
Other liabilities 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.037 
  
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
Square liabilities 
  
0.005 -0.069 
   
(0.122) (0.117) 
Constant         -0.282 0.480 0.245 0.618 
 
(1.075) (0.967) (0.851) (0.955) 
R-squared           0.198 0.217 0.224 0.218 
N. of observations 1092 1092 1726 1092 
The table shows OLS point estimators of the endogenous variable market-to-book ratio, which is the market value of the 
common equity as a share of book value of common equity. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets. Fiscal balance is 
government revenues minus expenses as a share of GDP. Bank asset risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily bank 
stock returns adjusted for leverage. Leverage is the total liabilities divided by total assets. Fee income is the natural 
logarithm of bank non-interest income. Pre-tax income is the pre-tax income as a share of total assets. GDP per capita is in 
constant 2000 USD. Real GDP-growth is growth of GDP in real terms. Sum liabilities is total country bank liabilities as a share 
of GDP. Liabilities is total liabilities as a share of GDP.  Other liabilities is total size of other banks liabilities in a country as a 
share of GDP. Square liabilities is Liabilities squared. All regressions runs with robust standard error estimation, adjusted for 
correlation within each bank from year to year. *, ** and *** is statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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In Regression 5.B I continue from 5.A-(4), adding new definitions on systemic size. First I swap 
liabilities with sum liabilities, which are the total country liabilities as a share of GDP. In the 
same analogy as liabilities should sum liabilities affect market-to-book ratio in a TBTF and TBTS 
situation. However point estimate of the coefficient is insignificant. In (2) I split sum liabilities in 
liabilities and other liabilities, separating between the liabilities of the actual bank, and the 
liabilities of other banks in the country. Point estimates of the coefficients is estimated at 0,359 
and -0,035 for liabilities and other liabilities, liabilities statistical significant at <1% other 
liabilities statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimated on other liabilities indicates that 
the systemic size of other banks would affect market valuation of the analyzed bank in a 
negative way, possibly through a TBTS status. Though since liabilities is estimated with positive 
coefficient, other liabilities is more likely negative as a reason of increased competition with 
other big banks. Whether a bank is alone in being very large in a country or not, would give 
indications on if there is high competition. The ratio of other liabilities would also give indication 
on how many other systemic banks in the country, and for example how the bank is alone or 
not in providing for the payment system. In a country with many large banks, each would have 
less importance in the payment system, and other vital parts of the financial markets.  
In regression 5.B-(3) I include square liabilities to allow for a non-linear relationship between 
bank systemic size and market-to-book ratio. Its coefficient is estimated at 0,009, statistically 
insignificant. Liabilities are estimated with reduced point estimator, statistically insignificant. 
This could give indications on a non-linear relationship between systemic size and market-to-
book ratio, not covered for in square liabilities. This is consistent with the main critics expressed 
by Barth and Schnabel (2011), about using liabilities-to-GDP as measurement of systemic size, 
due to non-linear relationship. Regression 5.B-(3) has the highest explanatory power of 22,4 % 
on the fluctuations in market-to-book ratio.  
As of the other explaining variables; assets is mostly unchanged through Regressions table 5.B. 
Fiscal balance is less stable with statistical insignificant and with very small point estimator; 
casting doubt on the linear relationship between market-to-book ratio and state of government 
public finances measured through fiscal balance.  
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5.1.3 Regressions table 5.C 
Market-to-book (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) 
Assets           -0.107 -0.103 -0.105 -0.101 
                 (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
Fiscal balance    0.015 0.004 0.015 0.004 
                 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bank asset risk * Leverage -0.255 -0.256 -0.247 -0.248 
                 (0.073) (0.073) (0.020) (0.018) 
Bank asset risk    0.235 0.236 0.222 0.223 
                 (0.067) (0.067) (0.019) (0.017) 
Leverage         2.448 2.516 2.443 2.510 
                 (0.879) (0.873) (0.881) (0.874) 
Fee income        0.073 0.066 0.070 0.063 
                 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) 
Pre-tax income           17.067 17.392 17.087 17.412 
                 (5.683) (5.708) (5.694) (5.719) 
GDP per capita        -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
                 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth        0.078 0.075 0.077 0.074 
                 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Liabilities      0.205 0.306 0.207 0.308 
                 (0.112) (0.084) (0.112) (0.084) 
Liabilities * Fiscal balance 
 
0.051 
 
0.051 
                 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
Liabilities * Bank asset risk * Leverage 
 
0.313 0.314 
                 
  
(0.042) (0.041) 
Constant         0.251 0.227 0.273 0.249 
                 (0.839) (0.831) (0.840) (0.832) 
R-squared        0.250 0.259 0.254 0.263 
N. of observations 1725 1725 1725 1725 
The table shows OLS point estimators of the endogenous variable market-to-book ratio, which is the market value of the 
common equity as a share of book value of common equity. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets. Fiscal balance is 
government revenues minus expenses as a share of GDP. Bank asset risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily bank 
stock returns adjusted for leverage. Leverage is the total liabilities divided by total assets. Fee income is the natural 
logarithm of bank non-interest income. Pre-tax income is the pre-tax income as a share of total assets. GDP per capita is in 
constant 2000 USD. GDP growth is growth of GDP in real terms. Liabilities is total liabilities as a share of GDP. All regressions 
runs with robust standard error estimation, adjusted for correlation within each bank from year to year.  *, ** and *** is 
statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Regression 5.C-(1) is the same as 5.A-(4). In 5.C-(2) I add an interaction between liabilities and 
fiscal balance, which is estimated with coefficient 0,051, statistically significant at <1%. This 
relationship indicates that systemic banks do depend on the country’s financial state, as 
measured by fiscal balance. Whereas the positive point estimator revealing that systemic banks 
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will be priced higher when public finances are doing good, compared to systemic banks being 
priced lower when public finances are less good (<0%). Another observation in the regression is 
that fiscal balance insignificant when allowing the interaction between liabilities and fiscal 
balance. This indicates that the explanatory power of fiscal balance to market-to-book ratio is 
through the most systemic banks, which is consistent with a TBTS situation, where the market 
value of a bank depends on the fiscal state of the country. However the estimated coefficient is 
very low, casting some doubt on its economic significance.   
The determinants on liabilities*fiscal balance’ effect on market-to-book ratio could also be 
explained by banks owning large amounts of country government bonds, which value is likely to 
follow the state of country public finances. The effects can also be causal; it is not unlikely that 
large banks are more exposed to cyclical fluctuations, hence its market valuation reacts in the 
same way as government fiscal balance.  
In regression 5.C-(3) I replace the interaction between liabilities and fiscal balance with another 
interaction between liabilities, bank asset risk and leverage. This casts light on how the bank risk 
(as measured by bank asset risk*leverage) affect market-to-book ratio appear to depend on the 
bank’s systemic size, as measured by liabilities. Coefficient is estimated at 0,313, statistically 
significant at <1% level. This indicates that the market valuation of systemic size has a positive 
relationship with bank asset risk, saying that a relatively more systematic bank is rewarded for 
taking higher risk. This finding is the opposite as the effect from the interaction term between 
bank asset risk and leverage in my original regression 5.A-(4), indicating that larger banks could 
expect more of a financial safety-net provided by the authorities, since they are rewarded for 
taking relatively larger risk, or in other words strong evidence of TBTF protection on systemic 
banks.  
A possible alternative explanation is that the largest and most systemic banks are more 
diversified than smaller and less systemic banks; hence they are rewarded for taking more risk 
because they are able to hold more risk. In regression 5.C-(4) I include both the interactions, 
receiving similar results.  
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 5.2 Robustness checks 
In the first robustness checks, presented in Regression table 5.D, I swap liabilities variable with 
the various Big’ dummy variables in regressions equal to Regression table 5.C. By having a 
categorical definition of systemic size through dummy-variables I should be able to cover non-
linear effects on market-to-book ratio defined by bank systemic size.  
5.2.1 Regression table 5.D 
 
Market-to-book 
                         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Assets           -0.115** -0.116** -0.117** -0.117** -0.107** -0.108** -0.102** -0.103** 
                 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Fiscal balance    0.015 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.015 0.006 0.014 0.005 
                 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Bank asset risk * Leverage -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.259*** -0.256*** -0.258*** -0.261*** -0.262*** 
                 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.073) (0.070) (0.071) 
Bank asset risk    0.236*** 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.240*** 0.241*** 
                 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) 
Leverage         2.281*** 2.329*** 2.255*** 2.302*** 2.442*** 2.500*** 2.405*** 2.460*** 
                 (0.834) (0.827) (0.822) (0.815) (0.876) (0.871) (0.870) (0.866) 
Fee income        0.078 0.076 0.079 0.077 0.076 0.072 0.078 0.074 
                 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
Pre-tax income           17.053*** 17.229*** 16.946*** 17.118*** 16.976*** 17.264*** 15.973*** 16.247*** 
                 (5.702) (5.718) (5.670) (5.685) (5.665) (5.698) (5.346) (5.379) 
GDP per capita        -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
                 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth        0.080*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 
                 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Big01            0.205** 0.262** 0.197** 0.252** 
                     (0.093) (0.103) (0.093) (0.102) 
    Big01 * Fiscal balance 
 
0.018 
 
0.018 
                     
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
    Big01 * Bank asset risk * Leverage 
 
1.373** 1.357** 
                     
  
(0.555) (0.526) 
    Big025           
    
0.167* 0.272*** -0.116 -0.017 
                 
    
(0.092) (0.099) (0.095) (0.106) 
Big025 * Fiscal balance 
     
0.034** 
 
0.032** 
                 
     
(0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
Big025 * Bank asset risk * Leverage 
     
145.426*** 144.108*** 
                 
      
(25.871) (25.725) 
Constant         0.443 0.437 0.472 0.465 0.197 0.204 0.046 0.054 
                 (0.799) (0.794) (0.788) (0.782) (0.837) (0.831) (0.835) (0.830) 
R-squared        0.251 0.253 0.255 0.256 0.246 0.251 0.285 0.289 
N. of observations 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 
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Regression table 5.D - continued 
      
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Coef. 
(Std.err.) 
Assets           -0.106** -0.107** -0.102** -0.103** -0.102** -0.099* -0.104** -0.101** 
                 (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Fiscal balance    0.015 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.011 
                 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bank asset risk * Leverage -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.260*** -0.261*** -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.258*** -0.258*** 
                 (0.071) (0.072) (0.070) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) 
Bank asset risk    0.237*** 0.237*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 
                 (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) 
Leverage         2.527*** 2.565*** 2.439*** 2.476*** 2.593*** 2.574*** 2.586*** 2.570*** 
                 (0.896) (0.888) (0.874) (0.867) (0.918) (0.907) (0.913) (0.905) 
Fee income        0.077 0.074 0.079 0.076 0.072 0.068 0.077 0.073 
                 (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Pre-tax income           16.915*** 17.038*** 16.280*** 16.406*** 17.009*** 17.030*** 16.970*** 16.992*** 
                 (5.637) (5.627) (5.427) (5.421) (5.684) (5.659) (5.664) (5.645) 
GDP per capita        -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
                 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth        0.078*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 
                 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Big05            0.179* 0.298** -0.074 0.041 
                     (0.108) (0.116) (0.105) (0.112) 
    Big5 * Fiscal balance 
 
0.046*** 
 
0.043*** 
                     
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.014) 
    Big5 * Bank asset risk * Leverage 
 
128.706*** 125.975*** 
                     
  
(26.698) (26.959) 
    Big1             
    
0.248 0.416*** -0.077 0.101 
                 
    
(0.164) (0.154) (0.175) (0.154) 
Big1 * Fiscal balance 
     
0.087*** 
 
0.074*** 
                 
     
(0.024) 
 
(0.020) 
Big1 * Bank asset risk * Leverage 
     
221.022*** 197.857*** 
                 
      
(40.446) (39.509) 
Constant         0.099 0.138 0.001 0.039 0.031 0.056 -0.027 0.000 
                 (0.854) (0.844) (0.837) (0.828) (0.864) (0.855) (0.860) (0.852) 
R-squared        0.245 0.251 0.268 0.273 0.244 0.251 0.253 0.258 
N. of observations 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 
The table shows OLS point estimators of the endogenous variable market-to-book ratio, which is the market value of the common equity as a share 
of book value of common equity. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets. Fiscal balance is government revenues minus expenses as a share of 
GDP. Bank asset risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily bank stock returns adjusted for leverage. Leverage is the total liabilities divided 
by total assets. Fee income is the natural logarithm of bank non-interest income. Pre-tax income is the pre-tax income as a share of total assets. 
GDP per capita is in constant 2000 USD. GDP growth is growth of GDP in real terms. Big01-025-05- 1 is dummy variables on total liabilities as a 
share of GDP, respectively share 0,1-0,25-0,5 and 1. All regressions runs with robust standard error estimation, adjusted for correlation within each 
bank from year to year.  *, ** and *** is statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. 
The different Big dummy variables is estimated with positive coefficients 0,205 0,167 0,179 and 
0,248, respectively for Big01 Big025 Big05 and Big1 in regressions (1), (5), (9) and (13). 
Estimated coefficients of Big01 is statistical significant at <5%, Big025 and Big05 at <10%, and 
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Big1 insignificant. This reflect that banks with systemic size greater than 0,1 do have a positive 
effect in market valuation, compared to smaller and less systemic banks, consistent with a TBTF 
situation. However there seems not to be an increasingly TBTF status with systemic size, as the 
significance is falling to 10% and eventually insignificance for Big1 dummy. Another evidence of 
TBTF is also found in the interaction term between the various Big variables and bank risk (as 
measured by the interaction term bank asset risk*leverage). All estimated coefficient is positive, 
which indicates that banks with systemic size greater than 0,1 benefits through higher market 
valuation, as measured by market-to-book ratio, by increasing its risk.  
The other interaction, between Big variables and fiscal balance, is increasingly positive with size, 
Big1 having the largest coefficient of 0,087, statistical significant at <1%. This is similar to the 
findings in Regression table 5.C; bank pricing is to some instinct explained by the current state 
of public finances. Possibly explained by some degree of TBTS in the largest banks, or as result 
of other underlying factors not covered for in the regression, such as macroeconomic 
fluctuations affecting both country- and bank finances.  
The overall findings in Regression table 5.D are in line with the findings from Regression table 
5.C. From both tables it seems like systemic size greater than 0,1 is rewarded by investors 
through higher market-to-book ratio. Further I would like to present robustness check on the 
results regarding state of public finances affecting market-to-book ratio through fiscal balance, 
as showed in Regression table 5.B. In Regression table 5.E I swap the variable fiscal balance with 
primary balance and government spending as a share of GDP, as measured by my variables 
primary balance and government spending.  
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5.2.2 Regression table 5.E  
Market-to-book 
                         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
                 Std.err. Std.err. Std.err. Std.err. Std.err. Std.err. Std.err. Std.err. 
Assets           -0.129*** -0.147*** -0.111** -0.161*** -0.122** -0.143*** -0.111** -0.145*** 
                 (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) 
Gov. spend.         -0.016* -0.018** -0.008 -0.019** 
                     (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
    Primary balance   
    
-0.011 -0.009 0.015 -0.009 
                 
    
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Bank asset risk * leverage -0.447*** -0.453*** -0.256*** -0.454*** -0.433*** -0.440*** -0.258*** -0.440*** 
                 (0.023) (0.022) (0.073) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.066) (0.021) 
Bank asset risk    0.412*** 0.418*** 0.236*** 0.418*** 0.399*** 0.405*** 0.237*** 0.405*** 
                 (0.022) (0.020) (0.067) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.061) (0.019) 
Leverage         3.050** 2.857** 2.598*** 2.771** 2.612** 2.434*** 2.425*** 2.422*** 
                 (1.279) (1.151) (0.949) (1.123) (1.062) (0.920) (0.885) (0.921) 
Fee income        0.109** 0.101** 0.078 0.110** 0.114** 0.104** 0.086* 0.105** 
                 (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (0.050) 
Pre-tax income          13.841** 14.200** 17.337*** 13.955** 15.513** 15.590** 16.272*** 15.556** 
                 (5.492) (5.465) (5.751) (5.399) (6.860) (6.765) (6.177) (6.761) 
GDP per capita        -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
                 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth        0.076*** 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.079*** 0.100*** 
                 (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Sum liabilities   -0.026 
   
0.002 
                    (0.034) 
   
(0.028) 
   Liabilities      
 
0.346** 0.199 0.606** 
 
0.330** 0.032 0.365 
                 
 
(0.155) (0.239) (0.301) 
 
(0.160) (0.207) (0.252) 
Other liabilities 
 
-0.063* 
 
-0.069* 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.030 
                 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
Square liabilities 
  
-0.005 -0.113 
  
0.066 -0.015 
                 
  
(0.126) (0.123) 
  
(0.107) (0.105) 
Constant         0.316 1.184 0.381 1.476 -0.232 0.661 0.092 0.695 
                 (1.199) (1.108) (0.904) (1.110) (1.022) (0.869) (0.827) (0.862) 
R-squared        0.238 0.263 0.250 0.266 0.265 0.285 0.255 0.285 
N. of observations 1091 1091 1725 1091 965 965 1466 965 
The table shows OLS point estimators of the endogenous variable market-to-book ratio, which is the market value of the common equity 
as a share of book value of common equity. Assets is natural logarithm of total assets. Primarybalance is government revenues minus 
expenses plus interests paid, as a share of GDP. Gov. spend. is government total expenses as a share of GDP. Bank asset risk is the 
annualized standard deviation of daily bank stock returns adjusted for leverage. Leverage is the total liabilities divided by total assets. Fee 
income is the natural logarithm of bank non-interest income. Pre-tax income is the pre-tax income as a share of total assets. GDP per 
capita is in constant 2000 USD. GDP growth is growth of GDP in real terms. Sum liabilities is total country bank liabilities as a share of GDP. 
Liabilities is total liabilities as a share of GDP.  Other liabilities is total size of other banks liabilities in a country as a share of GDP. Square 
liabilities is Liabilities squared. All regressions runs with robust standard error estimation, adjusted for correlation within each bank from 
year to year.  *, ** and *** is statistical significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Variable government spending is estimated with negative coefficients in regressions (1) to (4), 
indicating that government spending do effect market-to-book ratio in a negative way. Perhaps 
through government have less capability of saving troubling banks if they already spending 
much compared to GDP. Another explanation is that banks investors are aware of possible 
increased future taxation of banks as a consequence of today’s high spending (Demirgüç-Kunt 
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and Huizinga 2012). The estimated coefficients are however very low, from -0,019 to -0,008, 
casting doubt on its actual economic significance in determining market-to-book ratio.  
Primary balance is estimated with insignificant coefficients for all regressions but (7), where it is 
positive 0,015 and statistically significant at <1%. This is the same result as with fiscal balance in 
regression 5.B-(3), casting doubt on the linear relationship between bank systemic size and 
market-to-book ratio. Also indicating that current state of public finances only matters for some 
of the bank; respectively more systemic banks, as the findings in Regressions table 5.C 
suggested.  
Lastly I will present a regression table not included in Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2012), 
where I include dummy variables related to years of possible structural changes in my data; 
respectively 1999 when introducing the common currency Euro and 2008 – which marked the 
start of the recent financial crisis.  
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5.2.3 Regressions table 5.F 
Market-to-book (1) (2) (3) 
  Coef. Coef. Coef. 
  (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) 
Assets           -0.109** -0.086 -0.092* 
                 (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) 
Fiscal balance    0.014 0.009 0.012 
                 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bank asset risk * Leverage -0.255*** -0.256*** -0.256*** 
                 (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) 
Bank asset risk    0.235*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 
                 (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) 
Leverage         2.531*** 2.223*** 2.213*** 
                 (0.942) (0.840) (0.831) 
Fee income        0.081* 0.061 0.060 
                 (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) 
Pre-tax income          16.861*** 16.744*** 17.112*** 
                 (5.787) (5.702) (5.665) 
GDP per capita        -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
                 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth        0.079*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 
                 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Liabilities      0.174 0.089 0.349** 
                 (0.117) (0.089) (0.140) 
Year<1999 -0.153** 
                   (0.076) 
  Year<1999 * Liabilities 0.097 
                   (0.146) 
  1999<year<2008 
 
0.155*** 
                  
 
(0.053) 
 1999<year<2008 * Liabilities 
 
0.237** 
                  
 
(0.102) 
 Year>2008 
  
-0.046 
                 
  
(0.073) 
Year>2008 * Liabilities 
  
-0.285*** 
   
(0.104) 
R-squared        0.254 0.264 0.257 
N. of observations 1725 1725 1725 
The table shows OLS point estimators of the endogenous variable market-to-book ratio, which is the 
market value of the common equity as a share of book value of common equity. Assets is natural 
logarithm of total assets. Fiscal balance is government revenues minus expenses as a share of GDP. Bank 
asset risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily bank stock returns adjusted for leverage. 
Leverage is the total liabilities divided by total assets. Fee income is the natural logarithm of bank non-
interest income. Pre-tax income is the pre-tax income as a share of total assets. GDP per capita is in 
constant 2000 USD. GDP growth is growth of GDP in real terms. Liabilities is total liabilities as a share of 
GDP. The year variables is dummy variables indicating which years being analyzed, e.g. Year<1999 
means dummy = 1 for all observations prior to 1999. All regressions runs with robust standard error 
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estimation, adjusted for correlation within each bank from year to year. *, ** and *** is statistical 
significance at respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. 
European banks seems overall to be price higher in the years 1999 – 2008 compared to the 
years 1987 – 1999, as the dummy variables are estimated 0.155 and -0.153, statistically 
significant at <1% and <5%. The years from 2008 – 2012 is less clear, as its point estimator is 
estimated insignificant. These findings could be due to cyclical differences, though the overall 
picture gives relevant information. The interaction term between banks in 2008-2012 with 
liabilities is estimated -0,285, compared to overall liabilities estimated positive 0,349, both 
statistically significant at <1% and <5%. This suggests that the most systemic banks are priced 
notably lower than the less systemic banks in the years 2008 – 2012, and compared to the 
entire dataset. This is consistent with a structural change regarding TBTF in 2008 towards less 
protection through the implicit safety net for the most systemic banks. There is no evidence 
found for a structural change in 1999 when Euro was adopted as common currency in the EMU 
countries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Chapter 6 – Summary and conclusion 
This thesis presents evidence that suggests European banks mostly are covered by the too-big-
to-fail protection, however with evidence indicating that the largest and most systemic banks 
might have grown too big to save, especially in the years after 2008. To summarize my analysis I 
would start with underlining absolute bank asset size’s negative role in determining market-to-
book value of European banks. Throughout my analysis negative estimated coefficients 
represents a robust negative relationship, consistent with some banks being too big for the 
authorities to save, though also consistent with broad diseconomies of scale in banking. It 
seems from these results that big banks would benefit through higher market valuation by 
reducing size.  
The other size-related explanatory variable Liabilities gives a less clear picture of TBTS, where 
the only the only evidence found for TBTS is for the most systemic banks in the years after 2008, 
represented by banks with Liabilities-to-GDP surpassing 1. Other evidence points on banks with 
systemic size greater than 0,1 to be more valuable than its less systemic peers; consistent with a 
TBTF protection on European banks with greater systemic size than 0,1. Strong evidence of TBTF 
is found through the interaction term of bank risk and liabilities variable, suggesting that 
systemic banks gain market value by increasing risk.  
The last explanatory variable Fiscal balance is not determined to have a significant effect on 
market-to-book ratio, casting doubt on current state of public finances affecting bank valuation. 
Though when interacting with systemic size greater than 0,25; coefficients are estimated 
increasingly positive on market-to-book valuation. Suggesting that the most systemic banks are 
increasingly dependent on current state of public finances, consistent with a tendency towards 
the largest banks gradually approaching status as too big to save.   
Banking in Europe has gone through vast changes the last 5 years, as illustrated by figures 4.A, 
4.C and 2.C. The full consequences are not yet covered for, though evidence found in 
Regressions table 5.F suggests that large European banks after 2008 is priced significantly lower 
than its less systemic peers, both in terms of absolute size and in relative systemic size. This is 
very much in line with the tendency that the largest and most systemic banks actively reduce 
size. Some of this reduction of size might come as a result of banks being aware of their position 
as too big to fail gradually being overshadowed by status as too big to save. 
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Appendix 1 - List of analyzed banks 
 
1 ABANKA VIPA D.D. 72 DEXIA SA 
2 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF GREECE 73 DNB ASA 
3 AKBANK TURK AS 74 DZ BANK POLSKA SA 
4 ALPHA BANK SA 75 EFG INTERNATIONAL 
5 ASYA KATILIM BANKSAI 76 ERSTE GROUP BK AG 
6 ATTICA BANK SA 77 ESPIRITO SANTO FINANCIAL GRP 
7 BANCA CARIGE SPA GEN & IMPER 78 EUROBANK ERGASIAS SA 
8 BANCA COMERCIALA CARPATICA 79 FINANSBANK 
9 BANCA FINNAT EURAMERICA SPA 80 GETIN HOLDING SA 
10 BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI SIENA 81 GETIN NOBLE BANK SA 
11 BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO 82 GRAUBUENDNER KANTONALBK 
12 BANCA POPOLARE DI SONDRIO 83 HELLENIC BANK 
13 BANCA POPOLARE EMIL ROMAGNA 84 HSBC BANK MALTA PLC 
14 BANCA TRANSILVANIA SA 85 HSBC HLDGS PLC 
15 BANCO BPI SA 86 IKB DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIEBANK 
16 BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES SA 87 ING BANK SLASKI SA 
17 BANCO DE CREDITO BALEAR SA 88 INTESA SANPAOLO SPA 
18 BANCO DE SABADELL SA 89 JULIUS BAER GRUPPE AG 
19 BANCO DE VALENCIA SA 90 JYSKE BANK 
20 BANCO DESIO DELLA BRIANZA 91 KBC ANCORA CVA 
21 BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO SA 92 KBC GROUP NV 
22 BANCO POPOLARE 93 KOMERCNI BANKA AS 
23 BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL 94 LANDESBANK BERLIN HOLDING AG 
24 BANCO SANTANDER SA 95 LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC 
25 BANIF SGPS SA 96 LOMBARD BANK MALTA 
26 BANK BPH S.A. 97 MDM BANK 
27 BANK COOP AG 98 MEDIOBANCA SPA 
28 BANK HANDLOWY W WARZAWIE SA 99 NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE 
29 BANK LINTH LLB AG 100 NATIXIS 
30 BANK MILLENNIUM SA 101 NORDEA BANK AB 
31 BANK OF CYPRUS PUBLIC CO LTD 102 NORDEA BANK POLSKA SA 
32 BANK OF GREECE 103 NOVA KREDITNA BANKA MARIBOR 
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33 BANK OF IRELAND 104 OBERBANK AG 
34 BANK OF MOSCOW 105 OLDENBURGISCHE LANDESBANK AG 
35 BANK OF VALLETTA LTD 106 OTP BANK LTD 
36 BANK SARASIN & CIE AG 107 PIRAEUS BANK SA 
37 BANK URALSIB OJSC 108 POHJOLA BANK PLC 
38 BANKIA SA 109 POWSZECHNA KASA OSZCZEDNOSCI 
39 BANKINTER 110 PROBANKA 
40 BANQUE CANTONALE DE GENEVE 111 RAIFFEISEN BANK AVAL 
41 BANQUE CANTONALE VAUDOISE 112 RINGKJOBING LANDBOBANK A/S 
42 BANQUE NATIONALE DE BELGIQUE 113 ROSBANK OAO 
43 BARCLAYS PLC 114 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP 
44 BASELLANDSCHAFT KANTONL 115 SBERBANK OF RUSSIA OJSC 
45 BASLER KANTONAL BANK 116 SEKENBANK TAS 
46 BBVA 117 SOCIETE GENERALE GROUP 
47 BERNER KANTONALBANK 118 SPAR NORD BANK A/S 
48 BK FUER TIROL VORARLBG 119 SPAREBANK 1 SMN 
49 BNP PARIBAS 120 SPAREBANK 1 SR BANK 
50 BNP PARIBAS BANK POLSKA SA 121 ST GALLER KANTONALBANK 
51 BRD-GROUPE SOCIETE GENERALE 122 STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 
52 BRE BANK SA 123 SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN 
53 BULGARIAN AMERICAN CREDIT BANK 124 SWEDBANK AB 
54 CAIXABANK SA 125 SYDBANK AS 
55 CAJA DE AHORROS DEL MEDITERR 126 TURKIYE GARANTI BANKASI AS 
56 CB CORP COMMERCIAL BANK AD 127 TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A.S. 
57 CENTRAL COOP BANK 128 TURKIYE IS BANKASI AS 
58 CIC (CREDIT INDUSTRIEL COMM) 129 TURKIYE SINAI KALKINMA BANKA 
59 COMMERZBANK 130 TURKIYE VAKIFLAR BANKASI 
60 CRCAM NORD 131 UBS AG 
61 CREDIT AGRICOLE SA 132 UNICREDIT SPA 
62 CREDIT FONCIER DE MONACO SA 133 UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE 
63 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP 134 USB BANK PLC 
64 CREDITO BERGAMASCO SPA 135 VALIANT HOLDING AG 
65 CREDITO EMILIANO SPA 136 VAN LANSCHOT NV 
66 CREDITO VALTELLINESE 137 VERWALTUNGS & PRIVATBNK 
67 CYPRUS POPULAR BANK PCL 138 VTB BANK JSC 
68 DANSKE BANK AS 139 WALLISER KANTONALBANK 
69 DENIZBANK A.S. 140 YAPI VE KREDI BANKASI AS 
70 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 141 ZUGER KANTONAL BANK 
71 DEUTSCHE POSTBANK AG   
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Appendix 2: table of variables and its sources.  
Variable name Description Data sources 
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity Compustat 
Liabilities Liabilities total divided by GDP Compustat and IMF  
Assets Natural logarithm of assets total, national currency Compustat 
Fiscal balance Government revenues minus expenses, as a share of GDP IMF 
Leverage Liabilities as a share of assets total Compustat 
GDP per capita GDP per capita, in thousands of 2000USD IMF 
GDPgrowth GDP growth in real terms, percentage points IMF 
Govspend Government spending to GDP IMF 
Primary fiscal balance Government revenues minus expenses and interest payments, as a share of GDP IMF 
Old-age dependency ratio Number of people older than 64 years as a share of working age population WDI 
Openness Sum of exports and imports, as a share of GDP WDI and IMF 
Sum Liabilities Sum of bank liabilities in a country, as a share of GDP OECD and IMF  
Other Liabilities Sum of the liabilities other banks in a country, as a share of GDP OECD and IMF  
Square Liabilities Square of ratio of liabilities total divided by GDP Compustat and IMF  
Big01 Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP > 0.1, and zero 
otherwise Compustat and IMF  
Big025 Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP > 0.25, and zero 
otherwise Compustat and IMF  
Big05 Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP > 0.5, and zero 
otherwise Compustat and IMF  
Big1 Dummy variable that equals one if ratio of bank liabilities to GDP > 1, and zero 
otherwise Compustat and IMF  
Fee Income Natural logarithm of non-interest income Compustat 
Pre-tax income Pre-tax income, as a share of assets total Compustat 
Bank Asset Risk Annualized standard deviation of daily dividend inclusive bank stock return, times the ratio of the market value of common equity to the book value of assets Compustat 
b1999 Dummy variable that equals one for all observations before year 2000, zero 
otherwise Compustat 
a2008 Dummy variable that equals one for all observations later than year 2007, zero 
otherwise Compustat 
e1999_2007 Dummy variable that equals one for all observations later than year 1999 and 
before year 2008, zero otherwise Compustat 
Bank balance sheet items gathered from Compustat Global – Fundamentals annual.  
Bank market value and standard deviation gathered from Compustat Global – Securities daily.  
WDI is the World Development Indicators, by the World Bank. 
Data from IMF is found through World Economic Outlook database. 
Data from OECD is found through OECD Banking Statistics. 
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Appendix 3: correlation matrix 
 
Market-to-book Assets Fiscal balance Bank asset risk Leverage 
Market-to-book 1 
    Assets -0,04 1 
   Fiscal balance 0,07 -0,18 1 
  Bank asset risk 0,02 0,06 0,00 1 
 Leverage -0,05 0,24 0,02 0,00 1 
Fee income 0,01 0,96 -0,18 0,06 0,14 
Pre-tax income 0,29 -0,02 0,08 0,01 -0,46 
GDP per capita -0,26 -0,07 0,45 -0,01 0,18 
GDP growth 0,36 0,03 0,23 0,00 0,10 
Liabilities -0,01 0,24 0,01 -0,01 0,21 
      
 
Fee income Pre-tax income GDP per capita GDP growth Liabilities 
Fee income 1 
    Pre-tax income 0,07 1 
   GDP per capita -0,15 -0,23 1 
  GDP growth 0,06 0,29 -0,28 1 
 Liabilities 0,19 -0,14 0,22 -0,09 1 
       
 
Appendix 4 – Regression .do files 
//Following package must be installed before performing the regressions: estout 
net install estout, from(http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/bocode/e) 
 
//REGRESJON 5.A 
eststo clear 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance Liabilities, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance Liabilities ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance Liabilities ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance Liabilities ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth, cluster(ID) 
esttab using Reg5A.csv, cells("b(fmt(3) label(Coef.)) t(fmt(a2) star)" se(fmt(3) par label(Std.err.))) stats(r2 N, fmt(3 0) labels(R-squared "N. of 
observations")) title("Market-to-book") varwidth(16) legend varlabels(_cons Constant ix1 BankAssetRisk*leverage) starlevels(* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 
0.01) 
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//REGRESJON 5.B  
eststo clear 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth SumLiabilities, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities OtherLiabilities, 
cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities SquareLiabilities, 
cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities SquareLiabilities 
OtherLiabilities, cluster(ID) 
esttab using Reg5B, cells("b(fmt(3) label(Coef.)) t(fmt(a2) star)" se(fmt(3) par label(Std.err.))) stats(r2 N, fmt(3 0) labels(R-squared "N. of 
observations")) title("Market-to-book") varwidth(16) legend varlabels(_cons Constant ix1 BankAssetRisk*leverage) starlevels(* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 
0.01) 
 
//REGRESJON 5.C 
eststo clear 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities ix2, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities ix3, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities ix3 ix2, cluster(ID) 
esttab using Reg5C, cells("b(fmt(3) label(Coef.)) t(fmt(a2) star)" se(fmt(3) par label(Std.err.))) stats(r2 N, fmt(3 0) labels(R-squared "N. of 
observations")) title("Market-to-book") varwidth(16) legend varlabels(_cons Constant ix1 BankAssetRisk*leverage) starlevels(* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 
0.01) 
 
//REGRESJON 5.D 
eststo clear 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big01, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big01 ix4, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big01 ix41, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big01 ix4 ix41, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big025, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big025 ix5, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big025 ix51, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big025 ix5 ix51, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big05, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big05 ix6, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big05 ix61, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big05 ix6 ix61, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big1, cluster(ID) 
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eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big1 ix7, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big1 ix71, cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Big1 ix7 ix71, cluster(ID) 
esttab using Reg5D.csv, cells(b(fmt(3) star label(Coef.)) se(fmt(3) par label(Std.err.))) stats(r2 N, fmt(3 0) labels(R-squared "N. of observations")) 
title("Market-to-book") varwidth(16) legend varlabels(_cons Constant ix1 BankAssetRisk*leverage) starlevels(* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) 
 
//REGRESJON 5.E  
eststo clear 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Govspend ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth SumLiabilities, robust 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Govspend ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities OtherLiabilities, 
robust 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Govspend ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities SquareLiabilities, 
robust 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Govspend ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities SquareLiabilities 
OtherLiabilities, robust 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Primarybalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth SumLiabilities, robust 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Primarybalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities OtherLiabilities, 
robust 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Primarybalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities SquareLiabilities, 
robust 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Primarybalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities SquareLiabilities 
OtherLiabilities, robust 
esttab using Reg5E.csv, cells(b(fmt(3) star label(Coef.)) se(fmt(3) par label(Std.err.))) stats(r2 N, fmt(3 0) labels(R-squared "N. of observations")) 
title("Market-to-book") varwidth(16) legend varlabels(_cons Constant ix1 BankAssetRisk*leverage) starlevels(* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) 
 
 
//REGRESJON 5.F 
eststo clear 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities c1999 ix8, robust 
cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities d2008 ix9, robust 
cluster(ID) 
eststo: regress pricebook Assets Fiscalbalance ix1 BankAssetRisk leverage FeeIncome PreTax GDPcapita GDPgrowth Liabilities e1999_2007 ix10, 
robust cluster(ID) 
esttab using Reg5F.csv, cells(b(fmt(3) star label(Coef.)) se(fmt(3) par label(Std.err.))) stats(r2 N, fmt(3 0) labels(R-squared "N. of observations")) 
title("Market-to-book") varwidth(16) legend varlabels(_cons Constant ix1 BankAssetRisk*leverage) starlevels(* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) 
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